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Abstract
We analyze a two-task work environment with risk-neutral but in-
equality averse individuals. For the agent employed in task 2 effort is
verifiable, while in task 1 it is not. Accordingly, agent 1 receives an
incentive contract which, due to his wealth constraint, leads to a rent
that the other agent resents. We show that greater inequality aver-
sion unambiguously decreases total output and therefore average labor
productivity. More specifically, inequality aversion reduces effort, wage
and payoff of agent 1. Effects on wage and effort of agent 2 depend
on whether effort levels across tasks are substitutes or complements in
the firm’s output function.
JEL Classification: D2, J3
Keywords: inequality aversion, wage compression, moral hazard, incen-
tives.
1 Introduction
In a recent study, Brosnan and Waal (2003) analyzed the response of ca-
puchin monkeys to unequal pay. In the baseline test, two monkeys received
a token that could immediately be returned to the experimenter for a cu-
cumber. The monkeys exchanged successfully in 95 per cent of the cases.
In the next test, one monkey exchanged for cucumber and the other one for
grapes. Now more than 40 per cent of the monkeys that were rewarded with
cucumbers, the less favored reward, refused to exchange. The rejection rate
even increased to 80 per cent when the other monkey received the better
reward without any effort (i.e. without having to hand over a token).
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There is by now a plethora of papers in economics arguing that rejection
of unequal pay is not restricted to capuchin monkeys, but is probably just
as typical of human beings.1 According to these studies, individuals are not
entirely self-centered, but care about fairness and relative rewards. Thus,
workers may envy those who get a better deal and suffer disutility from being
treated ‘unfairly’. Conversely, they may also have empathic preferences and
dislike outperforming co-workers. In this paper we analyze some implications
of other-regarding preferences for optimal contract design. If ‘inequality
aversion’ differs between socio-economic systems—e.g., Europe versus the
US—or even between corporate cultures, how would this be reflected in the
organization of work?
We consider the situation of a firm employing risk-neutral and wealth
constrained agents in two different tasks or occupations. In one task, effort—
respectively a perfectly correlated signal—is verifiable. In the other task it
is not, leading to moral hazard. For example, one may think of skilled
and unskilled labor, where the activity of the latter is less complex and,
therefore, relatively easy to verify. Alternatively, it may simply be that
some activities are inherently more difficult to monitor than others; think
of sales representatives versus employees working in-house. Similarly, the
effort of a manager is probably more difficult to assess than that of a worker
at a conveyor belt.
In such a framework, providing incentives is costly for the principal. The
workers with non-verifiable effort—category 1 agents—must be motivated
through some form of performance pay. This implies paying out rent be-
cause of the agents’ wealth constraint. By contrast, workers with verifiable
effort—category 2 agents—receive a fixed wage contract and no rent. If these
workers are inequality averse, they suffer disutility from the other agents’
rent and this requires compensation. This ‘inequality premium’ therefore
increases the firm’s costs of providing incentives to the agents with non
verifiable effort.
Accordingly, we find that greater inequality aversion leads to smaller
effort, wage and payoff (i.e. wage minus effort cost) for agents exerting tasks
subject to moral hazard. By contrast, the effect on agents with verifiable
effort is ambiguous. Greater inequality aversion does not necessarily mean
higher wages as compensation. The reason is that these workers’ equilibrium
effort may decrease, remain constant or even increase, depending on whether
effort levels are complements or substitutes across tasks in the principal’s
revenue function. Nevertheless, payoff differences decrease with the extent of
inequality aversion. Wage differences also decrease unless tasks are strongly
complementary.
We also analyze the implications of an improvement in the monitoring
1For recent surveys see Konow (2003), Camerer (2003) as well as Fehr and Schmidt
(2003).
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technology. Better monitoring or more informative performance measures
reduce the marginal cost of providing incentives to category 1 agents. As a
result, the firm requires that these agents exert more effort. If this also leads
to a higher payoff for these workers, then the payoff for the other category of
workers must also increase due to the larger inequality premium. However,
it does so to a lesser extent so that overall inequality is larger.
There are several recent papers analyzing contracts with inequality averse
agents. Bartling and Siemens (2005), Itoh (2004) and Neilson and Stowe
(2004) all analyze an environment with one principal and two agents. How-
ever, in contrast to our paper they consider situations where both agents
receive incentive contracts and compare their payoff (or income) ex-post,
i.e. after the bonuses for good signal realizations have been paid. Fur-
thermore, only Bartling and Siemens (2005) analyze a setting where agents
face a limited liability constraint. Englmaier and Wambach (2004) and Dur
and Glaser (2004) analyze sharing rules when an inequity averse agent com-
pares his payoff to that of the principal. Siemens (2004) analyzes optimal
employment contracts in an adverse selection model. There are also some
contributions that analyze inequality aversion in the context of team pro-
duction (e.g., Biel (2004), Demougin and Fluet (2003)).
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic model.
Sections 3 and 4 analyze the effects of inequality aversion on effort levels,
wages and payoffs. Section 5 expands the picture by adding monitoring to
the model. Finally, in the concluding section we discuss economic appli-
cations, in particular cross-country differences in productivity and mergers
among firms with different corporate cultures.
2 The model
We consider a two-task work environment, assuming for simplicity that each
task occupies a single agent. The value of output for the firm is v(e1, e2),
an increasing and concave function where ei ∈ R+ is the effort in task i or
equivalently the effort of agent i, i = 1, 2. Later in the text, we further char-
acterize v(e1, e2) in terms of whether inputs are substitutes or complements.
All parties are risk-neutral and exerting effort in task i costs ci(ei). We im-
pose the standard assumptions c′i(ei), c
′′
i (ei) > 0 for ei > 0, ci(0) = c
′
i(0) = 0
and limei→∞ c′i(ei) =∞, which ensure an interior solution.
Tasks differ in the verifiability of effort. We assume e2 is verifiable. The
principal therefore offers agent 2 a contract specifying a fixed wage payment
w and the desired effort level, leading to the payoff
pi2 = w − c2(e2). (1)
By contrast, neither the value of output nor the effort of agent 1 are
verifiable, implying moral hazard with respect to the first task. However,
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the parties observe a contractible signal s ∈ {0, 1} where s = 1 is favorable
information about e1 (see Milgrom (1981)). Note that in the risk-neutral
agency problem all relevant information from a mechanism design point
of view can be summarized by a binary statistic (see, e.g., Kim (1997)).
The assumption remains somewhat restrictive, as it presupposes that the
distribution of the principal’s information on e1 is independent of e2.2 We
denote with p(e1) the probability of the favorable outcome given the agent’s
effort, with p′(e1) > 0 and p′′(e1) ≤ 0.3 Given the binary nature of the
signal, the incentive contract for agent 1 reduces to a fixed payment F and
a bonus b which the agent receives when s = 1. Agent 1’s expected payoff
is therefore
pi1 = F + p(e1)b− c1(e1). (2)
Workers are assumed to be financially constrained; otherwise the first-
best would be feasible as is well known. To economize on notation, we simply
assume that wages must be non negative. Similarly, the agents’ reservation
utility is set equal to zero.
We capture the idea of inequality aversion by assuming that a worker’s
well-being depends on how his expected payoff compares to that of co-
workers. Specifically, agent i’s utility is written as
ui(pii, pij) = pii − βimax[pij − pii, 0]− γimax[pii − pij , 0]. (3)
The second term on the right hand side is the disutility from disadvan-
tageous inequality. Parameter βi ≥ 0 may be interpreted as the propensity
for envy. The agent is ‘envious’ in the sense that his utility is reduced if he
receives a lower expected payoff than the other agent. The third term is the
disutility from advantageous inequality, with γi ≥ 0 as the parameter for
empathy. An agent feels ‘empathy’ if his utility is reduced when he receives
a higher payoff than the other agent. We assume γi < 1 so that agents
experiencing empathy nevertheless prefer that their own payoff increases,
even when this also increases inequality.
This specification of inequity aversion is similar to the approach in Fehr
and Schmidt (1999), but new aspects arise from the consideration of incen-
tive contracts. First, we assume that agents account for differences in effort
cost when comparing each other. Accordingly, if two agents receive the same
wage but one of them is working much harder, this is likely to cause envy.
2Otherwise, the principal might choose e2 with a view to obtaining a more informative
signal in the moral hazard problem with agent 1. In particular, our set-up does not
include the case where the principal’s verifiable information is v(e1, e2) + , unless output
is additively separable in e1 and e2.
3These conditions guarantee that the agent’s problem is well behaved. They are equiv-
alent to considering binary signals satisfying MLRC and CDFC within the class of differ-
entiable signals with constant support.
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Conversely, the situation where the harder working agent receives a higher
wage seems to be less prone to cause envy.4
Second, we assume that agents compare their payoffs ex-ante, i.e. before
the signal has been realized, and not ex-post. This approach stresses how
relative comparisons affect participation constraints, which refer to ex-ante
expected utilities. The problem that we have in mind are wage differences
between larger groups such as workers and managers. Though an individual
manager may receive a low payoff at a particular point in time, this will do
little to appease a worker’s envy as long as there are enough other managers
earning very high payoffs. Finally, we wish to point out that a comparison
of ex-ante payoffs substantially simplifies the following analysis.
To simplify notation in what follows, we write
ui(pii, pij) = pii − αi(pij − pii), with αi =
{
βi if pii ≤ pij
− γi if pii > pij . (4)
The incentive compatibility condition for agent 1 follows from maximiz-
ing his utility with respect to e1, thereby taking pi2 as given. The difficulty
with the above formulation is that (4) is non-differentiable at pi1 = pi2. How-
ever, observe that u1(·) is a strictly increasing function of pi1(·), i.e. a mono-
tonic transformation. Hence the agent’s utility maximizing effort choice can
be obtained equivalently by maximizing the expected payoff pi1(e1), which
is everywhere differentiable and concave. This yields the incentive compat-
ibility condition
e1 = argmax
e˜1
F + p(e˜1)b− c1(e˜1), (5)
from which the bonus to induce effort e1 is
b =
c′1(e1)
p′(e1)
. (6)
We write the expected bonus as
B(e1) ≡ p(e1)c
′
1(e1)
p′(e1)
. (7)
Using this, the firm’s profit maximization problem is
max
{e1,e2,w,F}
v(e1, e2)− w − F −B(e1), (8)
subject to participation of agents 1 and 2, as well as limited liability:
pi1 − α1(pi2 − pi1) ≥ 0, (PC1)
pi2 − α2(pi1 − pi2) ≥ 0, (PC2)
w, F , F + b ≥ 0. (LL)
4See Siemens (2004) for a more extensive discussion about whether agents compare
income or rent.
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Noting that b > 0, and since w ≥ 0 follows from agent 2’s participation
constraint, the limited liability constraints reduce to F ≥ 0. Next we derive
two lemmas which greatly simplify the characterization of the equilibrium.
Lemma 1 The participation constraint of agent 2 binds and pi1 ≥ pi2, so
that α1 ≤ 0 and α2 ≥ 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
In words, if inequality aversion matters with respect to the contracts
offered by the firm, this can only be due to the fact that agent 2, the worker
with the observable effort, is envious of agent 1 and possibly also because
agent 1 feels empathy for agent 2. Of course, the issue of envy or empathy
can be relevant only if payoffs are unequal in equilibrium.
Lemma 2 The participation constraint of agent 1 never binds and F = 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
Intuitively, agent 1 gets a rent due to the moral hazard problem and
because of his binding limited liability constraint. Given F = 0, this agent’s
payment reduces to the bonus b paid in the case of favorable realizations of
the signal. Recalling that the bonus depends only on the required effort and
not on inequality aversion, the extent to which agent 1 feels empathy does
not directly affect the contract he is offered, although empathy will reduce
his utility and hence his actual rent. In the proof of the lemma, the fact
that the rent remains positive despite empathy is shown to follow from the
assumption α1 > − 1; that is, an agent prefers that his own payoff increases
even if this also increases inequality. To complete the preceding results, we
show that agent 1’s expected payoff is indeed strictly greater than that of
agent 2.
Proposition 1 In equilibrium, u1 > u2 and pi1 > pi2.
The first statement follows directly from the lemmas. Using (4), u1 > u2
is equivalent to
pi1(1 + α1 + α2) > pi2(1 + α1 + α2), (9)
where 1+α1+α2 > 0 since α1 > − 1 and α2 > 0, thereby implying pi1 > pi2.
3 Effort and output
From lemma 1 we know that the participation constraint of agent 2 binds.
Hence, we can solve PC2 for the wage
w = c2(e2) +
α2
1 + α2
[B(e1)− c1(e1)]. (10)
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Agent 2 is compensated for his effort cost and for the disutility he suffers
from the larger net payoff earned by agent 1. We henceforth refer to the
latter term as the ‘inequality premium’.
Using (10) and lemma 2, the principal’s maximization problem can be
restated as
max
{e1,e2}
v(e1, e2)− c2(e2)− α21 + α2 [B(e1)− c1(e1)]−B(e1). (11)
The first term represents the benefits of inducing effort. The next two
terms are the wage of agent 2. The final term is the expected bonus paid to
agent 1, who is compensated for his effort cost c1(e1) and receives the net
payoff B(e1)− c1(e1).
The first order conditions with respect to e1 and e2 are
ve1(e1, e2) +
(
α2
1 + α2
)
c′1(e1)−
(
1 +
α2
1 + α2
)
B′(e1) = 0 (12)
ve2(e1, e2)− c′2(e2) = 0. (13)
It follows immediately that the empathy parameter of agent 1, α1, has no
effect on equilibrium values. The reason is simply that this agent’s participa-
tion constraint does not bind, as shown in the preceding section. Empathy
reduces the agent’s utility, but does not affect the cost to the firm of induc-
ing effort. Thus, it is only agent 2’s propensity for envy, α2, that will matter
in equilibrium. Accordingly, when we refer to an increase in inequality aver-
sion, we shall mean an increase in the propensity for envy, irrespective of
whether the propensity for empathy also increases.
A larger α2 makes it more costly for the principal to provide incentives to
agent 1, since it increases the compensation that must be paid to the envious
agent 2. The firm therefore adjusts by requiring less effort from agent 1,
which means a lower powered contract with a smaller bonus. Differentiating
the equilibrium conditions and applying Cramer’s rule yields (see Appendix),
de1
dα2
= ϕ (ve2e2 − c′′2) < 0, (14)
where
ϕ ≡
(
1
(1+α2)2
)
(B′ − c′1)[
ve1e1 +
(
α2
1+α2
)
c′′1 −
(
1 + α21+α2
)
B′′
]
(ve2e2 − c′′2)− (ve1e2)2
> 0 (15)
and where veiej denotes the cross partial derivative.
To see that the signs are correct, note that B′(e1) > c′1(e1) from the
definition of the expected bonus and the curvature assumptions. Further-
more, the denominator in (15) is positive provided that the second-order
condition for an interior maximum is satisfied, which we assume to be the
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case.5 The signs then follow from the concavity of the output function and
the convexity of the cost functions.
Turning to agent 2, observe from (10) that a larger α2 increases the
inequality premium, which depends on e1, but does not directly affect the
marginal costs of inducing effort e2. However, there is an indirect effect if
ve1e2 6= 0, which results from changes in the equilibrium effort of agent 1.
If ve1e2 > 0, then as e1 falls so do marginal returns to the complementary
input e2; hence a lower e2 becomes optimal. By contrast, if ve1e2 < 0, then
the lower e1 increases marginal returns to e2 and requiring more effort from
agent 2 becomes optimal. Formally, again using Cramer’s rule,
de2
dα2
= −ϕve1e2 . (16)
Finally, we show that more inequality aversion reduces total output in
equilibrium or equivalently that it leads to a fall in the average productivity
of labor (measured as average per-worker output). Differentiating the value
of output function,
dv(e1, e2)
dα2
= ve1
de1
dα2
+ ve2
de2
dα2
= ϕ (ve1ve2e2 − ve2ve1e2 − ve1c′′2) < 0, (17)
where the sign of the expression in parenthesis follows from the concavity
of the output function.6 We summarize the results of this section in the
following proposition.
Proposition 2 More inequality aversion reduces equilibrium output and the
effort of agent 1. The effort of agent 2 decreases (increases) if the cross
derivative ve1e2 is positive (negative).
4 Wages and payoffs
We now analyze how inequality aversion affects wages and payoff differences.
Total differentiation of the expression for agent 2’s wage in (10) yields
dw
dα2
=
B(e1)− c1(e1)
(1 + α2)2
+
(
α2
1 + α2
)
[B′(e1)− c′1(e1)]
de1
dα2
+ c′2(e2)
de2
dα2
. (18)
5The denominator is the determinant of the Hessian of the objective function, which
must be positive for a regular interior maximum. This will be the case if c′′1 −B′′ < 0—a
sufficient condition for this is c′′′1 ≥ 0, p′′′ ≤ 0—and if the absolute value of the cross
partial derivative ve1e2 is not too large.
6Differentiating the marginal rate of substitution, the isoquant has the correct curva-
ture if
d
de2

− de1
de2

=
d
de2

ve2
ve1

=
ve1ve2e2 − ve2ve1e2
v2e1
< 0.
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Recall that agent 2’s wage consists of the inequality premium and the
compensation for effort cost. The first term in (18) describes the direct
effect of an increase in α2; that is, the increase of agent 2’s inequality pre-
mium when holding e1 fixed. The second term is the indirect effect on the
inequality premium that works via the induced change in e1. In particular,
as e1 falls, the net payoff B(e1)− c1(e1) of agent 1 decreases, implying that
there is less to be envious about. Accordingly, this effect reduces agent 2’s
inequality premium. Without a further specification of functional forms it
is therefore unclear whether changes in α2 increase or reduce the inequality
premium.
Finally, from proposition 2 we know that e2 remains unchanged only if
ve1e2 = 0. In all other cases there will be a third effect as changes in α2
affect agent 2’s effort and therefore his effort cost. Obviously, the effects of
inequality aversion on payoffs – i.e. wage less effort costs – are the same,
except that the last effect disappears.
Despite the ambiguous effect of inequality aversion on the wage and
payoff of agent 2, payoff differentials always decrease in α2. The reason is
simply that payoff differentials become more costly as inequality aversion
increases. To prove this, substitute from (1), (2) and (10) to obtain
pi1 − pi2 = B(e1)− c1(e1)1 + α2 . (19)
Total differentiation then yields
d(pi1 − pi2)
dα2
=
B′(e1)− c′1(e1)
1 + α2
de1
dα2
− B(e1)− c1(e1)
(1 + α2)
2 < 0. (20)
The wage differential is obtained by adding c1(e1)−c2(e2) to (19), yield-
ing
d[B(e1)− w]
dα2
=
(
B′(e1) + α2c′1(e1)
1 + α2
)
de1
dα2
− B(e1)− c1(e1)
(1 + α2)
2 − c′2(e2)
de2
dα2
.
(21)
Usually, this term will be negative. Only if effort is strongly complemen-
tary so that de2/dα2 < 0 (see proposition 2), may wage differentials increase
in α2.
Proposition 3 More inequality aversion reduces the wage and payoff of
agent 1 and leads to smaller payoff differences between agents. Wage differ-
ences also decrease, unless e1 and e2 are strongly complementary.
5 Monitoring and spillovers
The consideration of inequality aversion leads to interesting feed-back effects.
For instance, suppose that for some exogenous reason the technology used
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to monitor the category 1 worker improves. Improvements in information
technology suggest that such a development may actually have taken place
over the last two decades or so (see Garicano (2000)).
In the absence of inequality aversion, this would only affect the agent
who receives an incentive contract. This changes once we allow for inequality
aversion. Let θ represent the monitoring technology. A better technology
affects the probability with which a good signal is observed. As a result,
the expected bonus B(e1, θ) for inducing a given effort level now becomes a
function of θ. Intuitively, with better monitoring the firm can elicit a desired
effort level with a smaller expected bonus. Furthermore, the marginal cost
to the firm of inducing additional effort should decrease in θ. Therefore, we
assume Bθ(e1, θ) < 0 and Be1θ(e1, θ) < 0.
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We first determine the effect of θ on agent 1’s payoff. Total differentiation
yields
dpi1
dθ
= Bθ + (Be1 − c′1)
de1
dθ
(22)
where
de1
dθ
=
(
1 + α21+α2
)
(ve2e2 − c′′2)Be1θ[
ve1e1 +
(
α2
1+α2
)
c′′1 −
(
1 + α21+α2
)
Be1e1
]
(ve2e2 − c′′2)− (ve1e2)2
> 0.
(23)
The latter, again applying Cramer’s rule, is obtained from the equilib-
rium conditions (12) and (13) rewritten so as to incorporate monitoring (the
denominator in (23) is positive by the second-order condition). As in section
3, the effect on e2 depends solely on the sign of the cross derivative ve1e2.
A better monitoring technology has two effects on agent 1’s payoff. First,
the bonus that is required to induce a desired effort level falls. Secondly,
better monitoring technology implies that it becomes optimal for the princi-
pal to induce more effort. As a result, the overall effect on the agent’s payoff
is ambiguous.8
Turning to agent 2’s payoff, note that from (1), (2) and (10),
pi2 =
(
α2
1 + α2
)
pi1. (24)
The payoff of agent 2 is simply his inequality premium, by which he is com-
pensated for envying the payoff of agent 1. Obviously, the required compen-
sation increases in agent 1’s payoff and this spillover is larger the greater the
degree of inequality aversion α2. The next result follows straightforwardly.
7See Demougin and Fluet (2001) for a general formulation.
8To provide an example, pi1 increases if c1(e1) = 0.5e
2
1 and p(e1, θ) = e
θ
1, where e1, θ ∈
[0, 1]. See Demougin and Fluet (2001) for a justification of this specification of monitoring
technology.
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Proposition 4 If an improvement in the technology to monitor agent 1
increases (decreases) the payoff of this agent, then the payoff of agent 2 and
payoff differences also increase (decrease). Spillovers are greater, the greater
the degree of inequality aversion.
6 Concluding remarks and discussion
This paper has analyzed a simple two-task environment in which a firm
employs two wealth constrained agents. For agent 2, effort is verifiable,
while for agent 1 it is not. Accordingly, only agent 1 receives an incentive
contract, which leads to a positive rent and a payoff that the other agent
resents. Inequality aversion affects the optimal contracts of both agents.
In particular, more inequality aversion on the part of agent 2 reduces the
effort, wage and payoff of agent 1. It also leads to a compression of payoffs. If
the principal’s revenue is additively separable in the agents’ effort, then the
effort of agent 2 remains unchanged, but wage differences decrease. Finally,
an improvement in the monitoring technology affects the payoff of both
agents in the same direction, but effects on agent 1 are more pronounced.
These results are based on the assumption that agents compare expected
payoffs. We have motivated this approach in section 2, but it might be
interesting to see how the results are affected if actual payoffs (or income) are
compared instead. In the case of a bad signal realization agent 1 would then
envy agent 2, a situation that does not arise in our model. The additional
effects complicate the analysis and, presumably, lead to less clear-cut results.
The analysis may help understand differences in productivity and wage
spread across countries with different cultural norms. For example, there
is some empirical evidence that preferences for a more equal income distri-
bution are stronger in Western Europe than they are in the United States
(Corneo 2001, Alesina, Tella and MacCulloch 2003, Schwarze and Ha¨rpfer
2003). There is also evidence that productivity and wage inequality is lower
in Western Europe than in the US (e.g. Hall and Jones (1999), Katz and
Autor (1999)). Our paper provides a possible explanation for this pattern
although there are, of course, alternative ones (e.g., Bental and Demougin
(2005)).
The analysis is also useful to understand problems that may arise in
mergers because of different corporate cultures. Though corporate cultures
are multifaceted constructs, one important aspect is the degree to which
employees find an unequal income distribution acceptable. For example,
consider two firms each of which having a structure as described in the
present paper. Suppose employees in firm H are more inequality averse than
those in firm L. Ceteris paribus, firm L would be characterized by higher
wages for type 1 employees and by larger payoff differences (see proposition
3).
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To focus on merger costs that arise from inequality aversion, consider
the costs of implementing the effort levels that existed before the merger.
Furthermore, assume that after the merger the type 1 employee in firm H
compares his payoff with that of the type 1 employee in firm L. This leads to
envy and the wage of the type 1 employee in firm H must increase in order
to implement pre-merger effort levels. As a consequence, the wage of the
type 2 employee in firm H also increases. Observe that there is no opposite
effect in the other firm, where the costs of implementing pre-merger effort
levels remain constant.
Obviously, this discussion neglects that firms may adjust effort levels
after the merger. The merger may also have positive effects on the revenue
function. Nevertheless, the analysis shows that it is often not possible for
the merged firm to simply replicate the behavior of the previously separate
firms if different corporate cultures continue to prevail.
Furthermore, there exists some anecdotic evidence for an upward ad-
justment of wages in merged firm. For example, one reason why the merger
between Daimler Benz and Chrysler Corporation started off rocky was that
senior executives at Daimler earned a lot less than their Chrysler counter-
parts. To narrow the gap, pay packages to Daimler managers were substan-
tially increased (Schellhardt 1999).9
7 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Contrary to the claim that PC2 is binding, suppose
pi2 − α2(pi1 − pi2) > 0. (25)
Observe that α2 has been defined such that α2(pi1−pi2) ≥ 0. Hence pi2 =
w − c2(e2) > 0. If PC1 were also not binding, then the firm could increase
its profits by reducing w. Accordingly, PC1 would have to be binding so
that
α1pi2 = (1 + α1)pi1 (26)
Adding this to (25) yields
pi2(1 + α1 + α2) > pi1(1 + α1 + α2). (27)
From the definition of αi it is not possible for α1 and α2 to be both
negative. Furthermore, αi > − 1 by assumption. Therefore, 1+α1+α2 > 0
9Another example how equity concerns can wreck mergers is given by Bartling and
Siemens (2005). They discuss the 1980 acquisition of Houston Oil and Minerals Corpo-
ration by Tenneco, Inc., where only the former had a corporate culture of high powered
incentive payments.
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and (27) implies pi2 > pi1. Writing out the participation constraints for this
case yields
[F +B(e1)− c1(e1)](1 + β1)− β1[w − c2(e2)] = 0 (28)
[w − c2(e2)] (1− γ2) + γ2[F +B(e1)− c1(e1)] > 0. (29)
However, this can not be a solution of the firm’s problem, since it could
increase profits by reducing w. Hence we have derived a contradiction and
conclude that PC2 is binding.
Obviously, this implies u1 ≥ u2 = 0. Upon substitution from (4),
pi1(1 + α1 + α2) ≥ pi2(1 + α1 + α2), (30)
which has already been shown to imply pi1 ≥ pi2. Therefore, the only relevant
forms of inequality aversion are ‘empathy’ (α1 ≤ 0) for agent 1 and ‘envy’
(α2 ≥ 0) for agent 2. 2
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose to the contrary that PC1 binds. Solving PC2
for pi2 and substituting this into PC1, we find
pi1(1 + α1)− α1α21 + α2pi1 = 0. (31)
Since 1 + α1 > 0 and given that α1α2/(1 + α2) ≤ 0 by lemma 1, this
can only be satisfied if pi1 = 0. Denote the signal elasticity by (e1) =
e1p
′(e1)/p(e1) and observe that (e1) ∈ [0, 1] by concavity of p(e1). Upon
substitution and noting that e1c′1(e1) > c1(e1) by strict convexity of the cost
function,
B(e1) =
e1c
′
1(e1)
(e1)
> c1(e1), (32)
a contradiction to pi1 = 0 (see equation (2), keeping in mind F ≥ 0).
Using the results that PC2 is binding while PC1 is not, the firm’s problem
can be rewritten as
max
{e1,e2,F}
v(e1, e2)−
(
c2(e2) +
α2
1 + α2
[F +B(e1)− c1(e1)]
)
−F−B(e1), (33)
s.t. F ≥ 0. (34)
Obviously, the firm will choose F = 0. 2
Calculation of de1/dα2. Denoting the principal’s objective function (11) by
G and applying Cramer’s rule yields
de1
dα2
= −
det
(
Ge1α2 Ge1e2
Ge2α2 Ge2e2
)
det
(
Ge1e1 Ge1e2
Ge2e1 Ge2e2
) = − Ge1α2Ge2e2
Ge1e1Ge2e2 − (Ge1e2)2
. (35)
Upon substitution, this yields (14) and (15). Calculation of de2/dα2 and
de1/dθ proceeds in the same way.
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